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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE ILLINOIS
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DISCLOSURE ACT-
GLEN ELLYN SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION V. TSOUMAS
An increasing number of residential neighborhoods in the country's major
metropolitan areas are rapidly declining due to the practice of redlining.1
Congress has recognized that financial institutions are redlining 2 certain city
neighborhoods by refusing to make mortgage or home improvement loans at
reasonable interest rates, 3 regardless of the credit worthiness of the potential
borrower. 4  As a result, many urban dwellers are denied their only possible
means of obtaining finance for the sale, improvement, or revitalization of
their neighborhood homes. 5
Both Congress and state legislatures have enacted statutes designed to call
attention to the practice of redlining where it exists. These statutes, the
Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 6 and the Illinois Financial Institu-
tions Disclosure Act, 7 require financial institutions to publicly disclose vari-
ous statistics relating to their lending practices. 8 Since the passage of these
two acts, there has been a great deal of controversy over whether the Illinois
1. ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION, REDLINING DISCRIMINATION IN
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS (May, 1975, Report to the Illinois General Assembly).
2. S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975). "Redlining" is a popular term for
disinvestment by lenders in older communities. The term derives from the practice of actually
drawing a line around certain sections of the map which are considered "high risk" lending
areas. Today, the practice is much more subtle. Id. at 3. The initial effect of this disinvestment
by lenders is that homes become increasingly difficult to sell because prospective buyers are
being denied mortgage loans. Subsequently, property values decrease, homeowners move out
and the neighborhood begins to deteriorate. See generally Ryan, Redlining, 1977 ANN. SURVEY
AM. L., 57 (1977); Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U.L. REV. 989 (1976).
3. S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
4. It has been suggested that financial institutions redline on the basis of race. Hearings on
S. 1281 Before the Comi. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 536
(1975). It is a fact that a greater number and dollar amount of loans are made in white areas. Id.
at 1085-1113. A recent study, however, shows that this fact is attributable to a number of factors
of which the racial composition of neighborhoods is just one. This study found that, whether
white or black, areas with low-income and relatively few single-family, owner-occupied dwel-
lings receive fewer and smaller mortgage loans. Conversely, regardless of race, areas with rela-
tively high median incomes and a higher percentage of single-family and owner-occupied dwel-
lings, receive more loans and in larger amounts. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 29, 1978, § 5, at 1, col.
2.
5. H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 561],
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2303, 2305.
6. 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1975).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, §§ 201-08 (1977). California and Wisconsin have also enacted
anti-redlining regulations. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE ch. 2, subch. 23, § 243.2 (1975); WiS. AD-
MIN. CODE ch. S-L, § 27.05(2) (1975).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 203 (1977).
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disclosure scheme is meant to apply to federally chartered savings and loan
associations. 9 In a recent Illinois Supreme Court decision, Glen Ellyn Sav-
ings and Loan Association v. Tsoumas,10 it was held that under the suprem-
acy clause," the Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act has preemp-
ted 12 the application of the Illinois Financial Institutions Disclosure Act to
certain federally chartered savings and loan associations operating in Il-
linois. 13 This Note will discuss the purpose and scope of the respective
Federal and Illinois Acts, the analysis that the Supreme Court traditionally
has applied in preemption decisions, and the impact of Glen Ellyn on disclo-
sure requirements by Illinois financial institutions.
FACTS OF GLEN ELLYN
The Illinois legislature adopted the Financial Institutions Disclosure Act
on October 1, 1975.14 The Act requires any institution '5 which operates or
has a place of business in Illinois to file a statement with the Department of
Financial Institutions, 16 showing the number and aggregate dollar amount of
written applications for mortgage and home improvement loans. Addition-
ally, it requires disclosure of the number and aggregate dollar amount of
these loans granted. 1 7  The Federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was
9. Since the instant case concerns a federal savings and loan association, this discussion will
be confined primarily to savings and loan associations. Savings and loans are the single most
important source of home financing in the United States. See JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL HOME
LOAN BANK BOARD, Oct., 1973, Tables S.5.3 and S.5.5.
10. 71 111. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 6: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States, which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrar, notwithstanding.-
12. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 976 (3d ed. 1969) defines preemption of a field as an
"[a]ction taken by Congress in passing legislation in a field theretofore open to state legislation."
13. 71 11. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 201 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Illinois Act].
15. Section 202(b) defines institution as "any bank, insurance company, mortgage banking
company or savings and loan association which operates or has a place of business in this State."
Id. at § 202(b).
16. Section 203 provides that "each institution shall file semi-annually with the Direc-
tor .. " Id. § 203. Section 202(a) defines Director as the "Director of the Illinois Department
of Financial Institutions." Id. at § 202(a).
17. Section 203 mandates that an institution must disclose:
the number and aggregate dollar amount of written applications for, and the
number granted and aggregate dollar amount of: (1) Loans secured by residential
real estate; (2) mortgage loans insured under the federal National Housing Act, Title
12, United States Code, Chapter 13; (3) mortgage loans guaranteed under the pro-
visions of the federal Veterans' Benefits Act, Title 38, United States Code, Chapter
37, Subchapter II; (4) construction loans; and (5) home improvement loans and loans
made in accordance with Subchapter I, 'Housing Renovation and Modernization,' of
the National Housing Act, Title 12, United States Code, Chapter 13.
Id. at § 203.
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enacted by Congress on December 31, 1975.18 It requires both federal and
state depository institutions 19 to make available, for public inspection and
copying, the number and total dollar amount of mortgage loans which were
originated or purchased by that institution during each fiscal year.20
On March 4, 1976, Glen Ellyn Savings and Loan Association, 2 1 a federally
chartered association, filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Illinois
Act was unconstitutional or void, and that the Act does not apply to federally
chartered financial institutions operating in Illinois.2 2  The trial court
granted Glen Ellyn's request for preliminary relief, which was subsequently
reversed and remanded by the Illinois Appellate Court. On January 18,
1977, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Act is
inappropriate and unenforceable against federally chartered financial institu-
tions operating in Illinois. 23  On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
decided that under the supremacy clause, the Federal Act preempts the
application of the Illinois Act to federally chartered institutions. The court
further held that because the Illinois Act contained a self-destruct clause, it
was invalid in toto.2 4 On October 28, 1978, the United States Supreme
Court declined to review the Illinois Supreme Court decision. 25
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
Federal Preemption
The principal issue in Glen Ellyn was whether the Illinois Act was meant
to apply to federally chartered savings and loan associations. Justice Clark,
writing for the court, noted that the plain language of the Federal Act re-
quires the preemption of the application of the Illinois Act to federally char-
18. 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Federal Act].
19. Compare id. § 2802(2), which defines a depository institution as "any commercial bank,
savings bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association, or homestead associa-
tion (including co-operative banks) or credit union which makes federally related mortgage loans
as determined by the Board" with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 202(b) (1977). The Illinois Act
applied to both federally and state chartered savings and loan associations. See note 16 supra.
20. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1976).
21. In addition to Glen Ellyn Savings and Loan Association, the Illinois Savings and Loan
League and its members were parties to the suit. Brief for Appellant at 8, Glen Ellyn Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Tsoumas, 71 11. 2d 493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978).
22. Plaintiff also sought a declaration that the regulations, instructions, information, and
reporting forms issued by the Department of Financial Institutions were unconstitutional or
void. Id. at 9.
23. The trial court also decided that the Illinois Act is unconstitutional and void to the
extent that it requires reporting of applications for loans and aggregate amounts of loans made
prior to October 1 by the federal institutions. Id. Since this is not an issue in the Illinois
Supreme Court decision, it is not relevant to this discussion.
24. The severability provision of the Illinois Act read: "If any provision of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such determination of invalid-
ity shall apply to all provisions of this Act. No provision is severable." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95,
§ 208 (1977).
25. See Chicago Tribune, Nov. 2, 1978, at § 1, at 2, col. 2.
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tered savings and loans.2 6 The language of the Federal Act, however, is not
as clear on this point as the court suggested.
The Federal Act does not expressly mandate whether federally chartered
savings and loans must comply with state law.27 In fact, federally chartered
institutions are not even specifically mentioned in the Federal Act. There
are two basic provisions of the "Relation to state laws" 2 8 section of the Fed-
eral Act. First, a state chartered depository institution must continue to
comply with state disclosure laws unless they are inconsistent with the re-
quirements of the Federal Act. 29  Second, the Federal Reserve Board 30
may exempt a state chartered despository institution from the provisions of
the Federal Act if it determines that the state institution is subject to re-
quirements substantially similar to the federal requirements. 31
Apparently, Justice Clark was not entirely convinced by the "plain lan-
guage" of the Federal Act, since he found it necessary to analyze the legisla-
tive history in order to determine whether Congress intended that federally
26. 71 II1. 2d at 498, 377 N.E.2d at 3.
27. 12 U.S.C. § 2805 (1976). If a state act is to be preempted by federal legislation, the
intent to preempt can be found either in the express provisions of the federal legislation, or it
can be implied by a reasonable interpretation of the federal act. See, e.g., Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations
Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
28. 12 U.S,.C. § 2805 (1976) provides:
(a) This chapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any State chartered
depository institution subject to the provisions of this chapter from complying with
the laws of any State or subdivision thereof with respect to public disclosure and
recordkeeping by depositor institutions, except to the extent that those laws are
inconsistent with any provision of this chapter, and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency. The Board is authorized to determine whether such inconsistencies
exist. The Board may not determine that any such law is inconsistent with any
provision of this chapter if the Board determines that such law requires the mainte-
nance of records with greater geographic or other detail than is required under this
chapter, or that such law otherwise provides greater disclosure than is required
under this chapter.
(b) The Board may by regulation exempt from the requirements of this chapter any
State chartered depository institution within any State or subdivision thereof if it
determines that, under the law of such State or subdivision, that institution is sub-
ject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this chapter, and
that such law contains adequate provisions for enforcement. Notwithstanding any
other provision of this subsection, compliance with the requirements imposed under
this subsection shall be enforced under (1) Section 1818 of this title in the case of
national banks, by the Comptroller of the Currency; and (2) Section 1464 (d) of this
title in the case of any institution subject to that provision, by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board.
29. Id. § 2805(a).
30. The Federal Reserve Board is the United States agency which acts with primary author-
ity in supervising banks in the Federal Reserve System. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1101
(3d ed. 1969).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 2805(b) (1976).
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chartered institutions be excluded from state financial disclosure laws. 32 Al-
though it was never specifically stated, a review of the legislative history of
the Federal Act indicates that Congress probably intended to preempt the
application of state disclosure laws to federally chartered savings and loan
associations. 3" This was not the intent, however, of the House or Senate
when they initially considered the preemption question. In the original
House 34 and Senate 35 Reports, it was unmistakably clear that both the
House and Senate intended that the Federal Act would require federal as-
sociations to comply with recordkeeping and disclosure requirements im-
posed by state law. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs decided that state law should take precedence in states with disclo-
sure requirements which were similar to or more comprehensive than fed-
eral disclosure requirements. 36  The House Committee followed this line of
reasoning, but added that the application of state disclosure requirements to
all financial institutions is particularly appropriate because "solutions to the
problem of urban disinvestment are going to come at the local and state
level." 3 7
The original drafts of the House 38 and the Senate 39 versions of the bill
did not exempt "any person" from complying with state disclosure require-
ments unless the state law was inconsistent with the requirements of the
Federal Act. 4 0  These drafts additionally allowed the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to exempt "any" depository institution from compliance with the
Federal Act if the state act imposed substantially similar requirements. 41
When the bill was under consideration in the House, Congressman
Stephens proposed an amendment which stated that the Federal Act should
not exempt any "state chartered depository institution" (as opposed to "any
32. 71 111. 2d at 498, 377 N.E.2d at 3.
33. See notes 34-45 and accompanying text infra.
34. H.R. REP. No. 561, supra note 5.
35. S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
36. Id. at 13. Senator Proxmire submitted the Senate Report from the Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 6, 1975. The Senate Report suggested that the Federal
Act "would apply to all institutions, with the provision that state law would take precedence in
states with substantially similar or more comprehensive disclosure requirements." Id.
37. H.R. REP. No. 561, supra note 5, at 19. The House Report on October 10, 1975 stated:
[T]o insure compliance by Federal institutions with stricter state disclosure statutes,
H.R. 10024 makes it clear that Federal institutions must comply with state law and
regulations, even if it should be inconsistent with Federal law by requiring mainte-
nance of records with greater geographic or other detail, or provide for greater
disclosure than is required by Federal law.
38. H.R. 10024, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 10024]. Section 306
of the House bill stated that "(a) This title does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person
subject to the provisions of this title . . . (b) The Board may by regulation exempt from the
requirements of this Act any depository institution within any State . (emphasis added).
39. S. 1281, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1975).
40. H.R. 10024, supra note 38, § (a).
41. Id. § (b).
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person") from complying with state disclosure requirements.4 2  Stephens
also recommended that the Board should be allowed to exempt any "state
chartered depository institution" (as opposed to "any" depository institution)
from compliance with the Federal Act if the state act imposed substantially
similar requirements.4 3  Representative Stephens' amendments were ap-
proved and incorporated into the version of the bill that became law. 44
Thus, while Congress originally intended state disclosure requirements to
apply to federally chartered savings and loan associations, the adoption of
Congressman Stephens' amendments indicate that Congress did in fact in-
tend to exempt federally chartered savings and loans from state law.4 5
Although the Illinois Supreme Court was arguably correct in finding that
Congress did intend to preempt the application of state law to federally char-
tered savings and loan associations, the court failed to consider adequately
the additional tests and standards traditionally applied in preemption cases.
While the United States Supreme Court has decided preemption questions
in a number of fields, 4 6 it has never considered a preemption question in the
area of savings and loans. The absence of any well-defined method of resolv-
ing preemption questions in the area may partially explain the court's super-
ficial approach.4 7 Nevertheless, the significance of the Glen Ellyn decision,
which rendered the entire Illinois Act invalid, warranted a much more
thorough preemption analysis. 48
42. 121 CONG. REC. 10,517 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Stephens). Stephens
proposed these amendments because he felt it was not "clear whether Federal regulation will
be adhered to in a savings and loan company if there is a difference between State regulation
and the federal regulation." Id. He said that he was concerned that the House bill could be
construed to require federally chartered savings and loans to comply with disclosure require-
ments imposed by state law. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was signed into law by President Ford on Dec. 31,
1975. (Public Law 94-200).
45. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference explained that the
House Conferees strongly believed that "subjecting a Federally chartered institution to state law
would threaten the dual banking system." H. CONF. REP. No. 726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1975). This statement makes it more certain that Congress did not intend to require federally
chartered institutions to comply with state law.
46. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (design and regulation of tank-
ers); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (marine fisheries); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (food labeling); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947) (labor law); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (alien
registration).
47. See Derenco v. Benjamin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 577 P.2d 477 (1978). In Derenco, the
Oregon Supreme Court explained that the apparent confusion and inconsistency in preemption
cases are due to the fact that the particular circumstances of each case are of compelling impor-
tance in reaching a decision. See also Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
48. When the congressional intent is not entirely clear, as in Glenz Ellyn, the judiciary exer-
cises broad discretion in formulating preemption policy. It has been suggested that the Court
needs to redefine its preemption doctrine by elaborating on its present preemption analysis and
[Vol. 28:805
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Although numerous preemption tests have been articulated,4 9 there are
basically two tests-both of which were ignored by the Glen Ellyn court.
First, a state law has been held void when it has been found to conflict 50
with the federal law. Second, when a federal act is found to "occupy the
field" 5' regarding a particular subject, a state is precluded from regulating
that subject in any way. Although at first glance these commonly used tests
appear to be quite workable, most preemption questions cannot be disposed
of by a simple determination of whether the state law conflicts with a federal
law or occupies a particular area of law. 52  More commonly, the dispute is
over the degree of conflict permissible or how broadly or narrowly the oc-
cupied field is defined. 53
Generally, a state law is said to conflict with a federal law when com-
pliance with both is a physical impossibility or where the law becomes an
obstacle to accomplishing the full purpose and objective of the federal
statute.54  For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that if
federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado having
more than a 7% oil content, while the state law excluded from the state any
avocado measuring less than 8% oil content, compliance with both statutes
simultaneously would be a physical impossibility. 55  Similarly, a Washington
tanker law required all oil tankers of at least 50,000 deadweight tons navigat-
ing in Puget Sound to take on a state-licensed pilot while the Federal Ports
and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), on the other hand, said that no
state government could impose an obligation upon a pilot of a ship engaged
in domestic or coastwide trade or fishing to get a license other than the one
articulating general preemption policies. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 [hereinafter cited as Hirsch]. Professor Hirsch proposed a four step
analytical framework which is intended to clarify the process of deciding preemption cases. id.
at 554-55.
49. The Supreme Court has used a wide variety of expressions in considering the validity of
state law, including: "conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; ir-
reconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference." Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
50. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
51. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. De-
troit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th
Cir. 1974).
52. The Supreme Court, in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973), pointed out that "each case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal
regulatory scheme in question." Id. at 638. Although this proposition seems obvious, courts
have often failed to adequately examine these regulatory schemes.
53. For an excellent discussion of the Supreme Court's preemption standards, See Hirsh,
supra note 48.
54. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
55. See id. at 143.
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issued by the United States. 56 It was held that the Tanker Law was in
direct conflict with the PWSA, and therefore invalid. 57 Compliance with
both the Washington Tanker Law and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
would be a physical impossibility.
The conflict in Glen Ellyn cannot be as summarily dealt with as it was in
the examples above. In those cases there were direct conflicts between the
provisions of the federal and state acts. In Glen Ellyn, however, the conflict
at issue was between the provisions of the Illinois Act (which applied to both
state and federally chartered institutions) and the alleged legislative intent of
the Federal Act to preempt the application of state law to federally chartered
institutions. 58
In addition to a determination of physical impossibility, a state act may
also be said to conflict with a federal law if it is an obstacle to accomplishing
the full purpose and objective of the federal act. 59 The Illinois Supreme
Court in Glen Ellyn clearly pointed out that both acts are directed at the
same general object. 60 Additionally, it admitted that the Illinois Act could
only further the purpose of the Federal Act. 61 Considering the fact that
both acts have identical purposes, it would be difficult to say that the Illinois
Act is an obstacle to the fulfillment of the purpose of the Federal Act. 62
56. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
57. The district court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), held that the
Washington Tanker Law was invalid in toto because it was in direct conflict with the Federal
Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Justice White held that the judgment was overly broad be-
cause it precluded the state from imposing pilotage requirements on any vessels (not just those
engaged in domestic trade or coastwide trade or fishing), which was not the intent of the
PWSA. Accordingly, Ray held that the state was still free to require tankers engaged in trade
with foreign countries in excess of 50,000 dead weight tons to take on state licensed pilots.
The Glen Ellyn decision closely parallels the district court decision in Ray, which was mod-
ified because it was overly broad. Similarly, the Glen Ellyn decision is overly broad because it
invalidates the Illinois Act in toto; it precludes the state from regulating state and federally
chartered savings and loan associations, even though the Federal Act was meant to preclude the
state only from regulating federally chartered savings and loans. See note 37 supra.
58. See notes 28-45 and accompanying text supra.
59. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976). In De Canas, the Court held that
the California Labor Code, designed to regulate immigration, was not preempted by the Fed-
eral Immigration and Nationality Act, which regulated the employment of illegal aliens. Id. See
also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).
60. The undisputed object of both acts is "disclosure of the geographical distribution of the
real estate securing the extension of credit by various financial institutions, with a view toward
elucidating whether such institutions have arbitrarily refused to extend credit secured by real
estate located in certain urban areas." 71 III. 2d at 496, 377 N.E.2d at 2.
61. Id. at 494, 377 N.E.2d at 3.
62. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), however, suggests that
the pertinent test is not whether the purposes of the act are similar or divergent, but whether
both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field. Id.
at 142. In Avocado Growers, California and the federal government imposed different tests to
assure the ripeness of marketed avocados. The purpose of the federal statute was to keep pre-
maturely picked avocados off the market. California's statute had the added purpose of protect-
ing consumers from prematurely picked avocados which are unpalatable. Justice Brennan up-
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The second traditional basis for preemption is the "occupation of the field"
doctrine. 63 In preemption decisions in some areas, the Supreme Court has
held that Congress has "occupied a field" when there is a vitally important
federal interest, 64 uniform regulation is necessary, 65 or when a federal
scheme is pervasive in its regulation of the subject matter. 66
A vitally important federal interest precluding state intervention was found
in Pennsylvania v. Nelson.67 The Federal Smith Act and Pennsylvania Sedi-
tion Act prohibited advocacy of the overthrow of the United States govern-
ment by force and violence. 68  Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Su-
preme Court, held that since the prevention of sedition was such a vitally
important federal interest, Congress had "occupied the field" and left no
room for the states to supplement the Smith Act. 69  It is necessarily within
the exclusive control of the United States, since it is a crime against the
United States and not a local offense. 70
In Glen Ellyn, there is an obvious federal interest in the prevention of
redlining in metropolitan areas. Redlining, however, is primarily a local
problem which requires solutions at the state and local level.71 The court in
Glen Ellyn did not recognize the existence of any local interest, but instead
recognized the need to protect certain undefined federal interests. 72
held the California statute, since "both the federal and state statutes can be enforced without
impairing the federal superintendence of the field." Id.
63. The Supreme Court has held that several areas of the law have been preempted by
federal law since Congress has "occupied the field." See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (aircraft noise regulation); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (regulation of warehousing rates); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941) (alien registration).
64. The federal interest in certain areas is so strong that the Supreme Court has held that
all state legislation in these areas is preempted by federal law. See, e.g., City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (safety of aircrafts, utilization of airspace,
and protection of persons on the ground); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956)
(preventing subversion of gover'nment); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (warehouse rate regulation).
65. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163 (1978) (uniform standards for
design and regulation of tankers are necessary for safety purposes and for the preservation of the
marine environment); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973)
(uniform regulation needed because of the interdependence of noise control and safety regula-
tion).
66. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942), in which the Supreme
Court held that federal regulation of interstate commerce is so pervasive that there is no room
for state regulation. See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
67. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
68. Id. at 499.
69. Id. at 505.
70. Id.
71. Reply Brief for Appellant at 18, Glen Ellyn Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tsoumas, 71 111. 2d
493 (1978).
72. Justice Clark stated in Glen Ellyn that Congress "retreated somewhat from its stated
purpose in order to protect the interests of certain Federal agencies." 71 I11. 2d at 499, 377
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Preemption decisions commonly have held that Congress has "occupied a
field" when there is a need for uniform regulation in a particular area. In
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,73 for example, the City Council of Bur-
bank, California, sought to enforce a city ordinance which made it unlawful
for a jet-aircraft to take off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11
p.m. and 7 a.m. The purpose of the statute was noise regulation. Justice
Douglas found that the interdependence of the factors of noise and safety
required a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation. 74  He pointed
out that if the Court upheld the city ordinance and other cities subsequently
enacted similar regulations, the fractionalized control of takeoffs and landings
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration to control traffic flow. 75
While there are compelling reasons for the uniform regulation of the hours
during which airports may operate, it is questionable whether there are such
compelling reasons for the uniform regulation of the disclosure requirements
of savings and loan associations. State and local control of mortgage disclo-
sure requirements may even be more practical than uniform federal control,
considering that redlining is not a uniform problem throughout the coun-
try. 7
6
The Supreme Court also has determined that Congress has "occupied the
field" when an existing federal scheme is pervasive in its regulation of the
subject matter. 77  Many lower courts which have considered preemption
questions concerning the application of state law to federally chartered sav-
ings and loan associations have found preemption. 78  These decisions have
consistently held that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, pursuant to its
broad grant of statutory authority, has adopted rules that are so compre-
N.E.2d at 3. Presumably, Clark was referring to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and its
interest in preserving the dual banking system. In the House Conference Report, it was stated
that "[i]n the case of mortgage disclosure ... the conferees on the part of the House strongly
believe that subjecting a Federally chartered institution to state law would threaten the dual
banking system." H. CONF. REP. No. 726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2333, 2336. But Congress failed to explain why or how it would
threaten the dual banking system. One of the fundamental principles of the dual banking system
is that savings and loan associations may choose to operate under federal or state law. See
generally Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Aodel of Competition and Regulation, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 6 (1977). Thus, depriving savings and loans of the choice of operating under Illinois or
federal disclosure laws may in itself threaten the dual banking system.
73. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
74. Id. at 639.
75. Id.
76. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs originally intended the
federal disclosure requirements to be a uniform minimum standard. The original bill (S. 1281)
was considered with full knowledge that more stringent disclosure requirements had already
been initiated in several jurisdictions at the state and local levels. Senator Proxmire recognized
that Illinois was one of the states that had introduced a comprehensive disclosure bill which had
already passed one house of the state legislature. S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1975).
77. See note 66 supra.
78. See note 79 infra.
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hensive that they govern all aspects of every savings and loan association
from its "cradle to its corporate grave." 79  On the other hand, there are
numerous decisions that indicate that savings and loans are subject to a vari-
ety of state laws, including taxation 80 and usury.8 1 Most of the cases that
resort to this general preemption language combine it with a narrow hold-
ing.8 2  For example, it has been noted that "it is apparent that Congress has
substantially occupied the field in regard to the regulation of federal savings
and loan associations, particularly in the area of lending practices." 8 3 As a
result, the law is in a state of confusion as to whether the entire field of
federal savings and loans is to be preempted, or whether preemption is to
be decided on an ad hoc basis. Regardless of whether the pertinent field in
Glen Ellyn is the field of federal savings and loan associations or the field of
mortgage disclosure, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court does nothing
to clear up the confusion. 8 '
79. See, e.g., California v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
Coast was the originator of the phrase "cradle to its corporate grave." Id. at 316. The phrase
was subsequently used to find preemption in numerous other decisions. Many of these decisions
have neglected to analyze the facts and circumstances of each case, and instead have summarily
dealt with important preemption questions by utilizing the "cradle to corporate grave" reason-
ing. See also First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of Jackson County v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
of Huntsville, 446 F. Supp. 210, 212 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823 (N.D. III. 1975); City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley,
393 F. Supp. 644, 655 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
80. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Johnson, 49 Cal. App. 2d 465, 122 P.2d 84 (1942);
State v. Minnesota Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 218 Minn. 229, 15 N.W.2d 568 (1944). But see
California v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 98 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Coast
points out that savings and loan associations are subject to state taxation only because it is
expressly permitted by 12 U.S.C. § 1464(h) (1933).
81. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Atlanta v. Norwood Realty Co., 212 Ga. 524, 93
S.E.2d 763 (1956), in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that Georgia's usury laws applied
to loans made by federal savings and loan associations in that state. See also City Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 655 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
82. While many of these cases suggest that Congress has preempted the field of federal
savings and loan associations, they narrowly define the preempted field in the ultimate holding.
See, e.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974) (prepay-
ment penalties); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Jackson City v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
of Huntsville, 446 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (unfair competition between two federal as-
sociations from similarity in names); Greenwald v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Boston, 446
F. Supp. 620 (D. Mass. 1978) (interest payments); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. III. 1975) (internal affairs); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. I11. 1974) (branch banking); Durnin v.
Allentown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 218 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (right of inspection of
membership lists); Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240
N.W.2d 367 (1976) (regulation of lending practices).
83. Kaski v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Madison, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 140, 240 N.W.2d
367, 372 (1976).
84. Upon finding that the Federal Act preempted the application of the Illinois Act to feder-
ally chartered savings and loan associations, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Act
was totally invalid. 71 Ill. 2d at 500, 377 N.E.2d at 4. The court voided the entire Aot on the
basis of a self-destruct clause found therein, which provided that if any provision of the Illinois
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IMPACT
In requiring Illinois and federally chartered savings and loan associations
to follow the same disclosure requirements, the Illinois Supreme Court im-
paired, rather than furthered, the common purpose of the Federal and State
Acts for two reasons. First, since the Illinois Act demanded more stringent
disclosure requirements, it was more effective in exposing redlining prac-
tices. Second, redlining is a local problem that can be more effectively ad-
dressed on the state and local level.
The Illinois legislature passed a comprehensive disclosure scheme to deal
with the redlining problem which plagued Illinois at the time of the enact-
ment. It required the disclosure of the number and dollar amount of
mortgage loans applied for and the number granted.8 5 The Illinois Act also
demanded disclosure by more institutions than the Federal Act. 86 The
Federal Act, on the other hand, requires only the disclosure of the number
of loans granted. 87 As a result of the invalidation of the Illinois Act, the
statutory purpose of providing citizens with sufficient information to deter-
mine whether depository institutions are meeting their obligation of serving
community housing needs is not being accomplished.
Potentially, the Illinois Act was a more effective disclosure scheme than
the Federal Act not only because of its comprehensiveness, but also because
redlining is a predominantly local matter that can be handled more effi-
ciently at a state and local level. 88 An individual state is in better position
to detect, and has a more direct interest in prohibiting, the practice of red-
lining than the federal government. Additionally, the practice is widespread
in certain urban areas and nonexistent in others. For these reasons, each
individual state should be able to require disclosure of lending statistics to
the extent necessary to deal with its particular redlining problem.
Act were found invalid, the entire Act would be deemed invalid. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, §
208 (1975), which provided that "[if any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, such determination of invalidity shall apply to all provi-
sions of this Act. No provision is severable."
The Illinois legislature included this self-destruct clause in the Illinois Act because it feared
that if the judiciary determined that the Illinois Act applied only to state chartered savings and
loan associations, there would be a rush of state chartered institutions to convert to federal
charters. See Debates on Proposed Financial Inst. Disclosure Act: H.B. 1103, 1975 Gen. As-
sembly, 71st day, 173-74 (remarks of Representative Lundy).
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 203 (1977).
86. The Illinois Act required disclosure of lending statistics from "any bank, insurance com-
pany, mortgage banking company or savings and loan association which operates or has a place
of business in this state," ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95, § 202(b) (1977), while the Federal Act de-
manded disclosure by "any commercial bank, savings bank, savings and loan association, build-
ing and loan association (including cooperative banks) or credit union which makes federally
related mortgage loans as determined by the Board." 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2) (1975).
87. 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1975).
88. Reply Brief for Appellant at 18, Glen Ellyn Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Tsoumas, 71 Ill. 2d
493, 377 N.E.2d 1 (1978).
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CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court took a superficial approach to the preemption
question in Glen Ellyn by failing to apply those tests that have traditionally
been applied in preemption decisions. The court found that the congres-
sional intent mandated a finding that the Federal Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act preempts the application of the Illinois Financial Institutions Dis-
closure Act to federally chartered savings and loan associations. It ultimately
held that the Illinois Act was invalid in toto because of the self-destruct
clause contained therein. As a result of Glen Ellyn, Illinois may not demand
mortgage disclosure by either state or federally chartered savings and loan
associations.
The court concentrated too heavily on finding the federal legislative in-
tent, and consequently, failed to give adequate consideration to the broad
purpose of both the Illinois and Federal Acts. The court overlooked the fact
that the state is in a better position to recognize when redlining is being
practiced and also in a better position to legislate against redlining according
to its own particular needs.
There is a need for Supreme Court guidance to determine the extent to
which federal law preempts state law in the area of savings and loan associa-
tions. Until the Court suggests the proper limits of preemption in this area,
lower court decisions will continue to invalidate state laws, like the Illinois
Financial Institutions Disclosure Act, which are more effective in making the
practice of redlining visible.
Charles A. Janda
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